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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the conclusion of a contract of civil law, the parties may  
take some reasonably unforeseeable economic risks that might disrupt  
the synallagmatic character of the contract; therefore, a disproportionate, 
unviable extra burden may appear in the contractual relations on the side 
of some parties. A sudden increase in inflation or prices, the intense 
reduction of the purchasing power of wages, the radical changes  
in the relations between supply and demand, the collapse of the product 
market, the insolvency of the economic actors (especially in the case  
of a contractual party), the negative changes of the market and financial 
relations and the production and liquidity problems of the economic sector 
will result in this incalculable risk. In the case of maintaining the original 
contractual content, an economic crisis affecting the whole economy  
and society of one or more countries may cause any or all the parties  
to bear inequitable and intolerable risks. 
In the following pages, we intend to analyse those reasons  
in the Hungarian judicial practice that are based on the Hungarian Civil 
Code and referred to by the parties in order to get rid of the contractual 
obligation in the name of economic/business risk. Then we examine  
the importance of economic/business risk in those contractual relations 
that cannot be found in the Hungarian Civil Code, and finally, we make  
a conclusion with respect to the current European regulations. 
  
II.  THE LEGAL REASONS FOR OBVIATING ECONOMIC/BUSINESS RISK 
ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CIVIL CODE1 
 
In accordance with the Civil Code2 in the course of exercising civil 
rights and fulfilling obligations, all parties shall act in the manner required 
by good faith and fairness, and they shall be obliged to cooperate with one 
another, and unless the Civil Code prescribes stricter requirements, it shall 
be necessary to proceed in civil relations in a manner that can generally  
be expected in the particular situation. No person shall be entitled to refer 
                                                     
1  The old Hungarian Civil Code (Act IV of 1959), which is in force until 15.03.2014. 
2  Section 4 (1), (4). 
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to his own actionable conduct in order to obtain advantages. Whosoever 
has not proceeded in a manner that can generally be expected  
in the particular situation shall be entitled to refer to the other party’s 
actionable conduct. In case of the framework contract about the sales  
of natural gas, because of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute on natural gas  
at the beginning of 2006, the gas service was hampered, and therefore,  
for supplying heat, the plaintiff produced the necessary quantity by oil 
heating, while the defendant could not receive any subsidy for gas prices 
during the period of suspension; the legal action taken by the defendant 
was based on Section 4 of the Hungarian Civil Code. There is no subsidy 
referring to that amount of gas which was not consumed, however,  
the defendant had the possibility to enforce his economic interests  
in connection with the potential business risk emerging by changing to oil 
heating: the plaintiff is not responsible for the missing of this opportunity 
by the defendant. The court held that the party neither violated  
the principle of good faith and integrity nor realized unfair conduct  
on the market by not warning his partner of the possible economic 
consequences and business risks of facts known by both parties3. 
In order to pass on or share the business risk, the parties intended  
to use the legal term of implied conduct4: in the analysed suit5,  
in the second half of 1989 the parties had negotiations about concluding  
an agreement in principle about a partnership of which the aim was to set 
up a joint venture, but at the time of the conclusion of the contract,  
the Soviet market collapsed and the parties tried to shift the losses  
on to each other. 
The party losing the investment wished to get compensation  
for the outstanding profit based on the above mentioned rule of “implied 
conduct”. The court held that the company itself had to cover the costs 
relating to the ordinary business risk that could emerge at the time  
of preparing the contract (e.g. in case of an investment that cannot  
be realized because of the bankruptcy of the product market of a country). 
                                                     
3  BDT 2008. 1900 [Casebook of the Courts]. 
4  The court may award damages payable in full or in part by a party whose willful conduct 
has explicitly induced another, bona fide, person to act in a manner that has brought harm  
to this person through no fault of his own. 
5  BH 1996.586 [Court Order]. 
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In another judgment6 the court held that in general it had no legal basis 
upon which to refer to the rule of “implied conduct” so as to pass  
on the business risk. 
In many litigations7 the same mistaken assumption (Civil  
Code § 210 (3))8 was the legal base for those contractual conditions  
to be voidable that became disadvantaged because of the business failure 
due to the negative economic circumstances; notwithstanding this the court 
declared several times that – in theory – the expectations and ideas falling 
under the business risk cannot mean that the contract can be voidable 
based on vitiated consent9. For example if the parties estimated the future 
increase of the prices of the contractual object and it proved to be less than 
it was in the reality, it cannot be regarded as same mistaken assumption10. 
In the following case the plaintiffs considered the contract for purchase 
of business shares to be voidable on grounds of deceit11. Before concluding 
the contract the defendants informed them in writing about the financial 
situation of the limited liability company12. The plaintiffs omitted to check 
whether the future expectations of the defendants, and the estimated 
economic results were realistic or whether the value of the business share 
reflected their expectations or not. The conclusion of the contract  
for the purchase of the business shares happened in November, 1994,  
while the so called “Bokros-package” came into force from December, 1994. 
This economic event, which was unforeseeable by the, limited liability 
company and the defendants, meant the changes of the economic milieu 
and relations, therefore, the arbitration held that the risks emerging  
in the operation of the association after the conclusion of the transaction 
and influencing the financial situation of the association in a negative  
way, must be accepted by the buyer of the business share. 
On the basis of Article 241 of the Civil Code, the court may modify  
the contract under three conjunctive conditions: the aim of the agreement 
                                                     
6  BH 1994. 179 [Court Order]. 
7  2003/1 [Arbitration Decision]. 
8  If the parties had the same mistaken assumption at the time the contract was concluded, 
either of them may contest the contract. 
9  BH 1998.272 [Arbitration Decision]. 
10  BH 1983.205 [Court Order]. 
11  1997/6. 
12  ltd: company with limited liability of members. 
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must be a persistent legal relation, and after concluding the contract  
the contractual relation must change, therefore, the contract interferes  
with an important and justified interest of one of the parties13. In judicial 
practice it occurred several times that the alteration of the contract  
by the court based on the economic crisis could not be applied in default  
of one of the conjunctive conditions: 
 the circumstance itself that some contractual provisions  
can be mistaken due to the unexpected changes of the market  
and financial relations, cannot be used as a legal base  
for the modification of the contract by the court, as an extra 
condition, the important and justified offense of interests  
of the party is required14, 
 in case of a legal action that aims to modify a persistent legal 
relation, it is not enough to refer to general circumstances  
(e.g. to changes in the price level) that emerged after the conclusion 
of the contract, but its influence on the contract has to be specified 
too15. In connection with modification of the contract by the court, 
not only section § 241 of the Civil Code was analyzed,  
but the conditions were interpreted too16. If the parties considered 
the future insecurity of the level of production and the way  
in which the profit turned out to be a mutual risk at the time  
of the conclusion of the contract, the parties had to take into 
account these types of changes in the circumstances; in this case  
the modification of the contract based on important and justified 
injury of interests cannot be claimed. Neither can the alteration  
of the contract by the court be suggested with reference  
to the § 241 of the Civil Code, if it is about the widespread 
consequences of the basic social-economic changes17. The inflation 
                                                     
13  A Ptk. magyarázata [The Comment of the Hungarian Civil Code], Budapest: Közlönykiadó 
2007, p. 319; G. Gellért (ed.), A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázata [The Comment of the Civil 
Code], Budapest: CompLex 2007, p. 905; F. Petrik (ed.), Kommentár a gyakorlat számára 
[Comment for the Practice], Budapest: hvgorac 2008, p. 423. 
14  BDT 2007. 1707 [Casebook of the Courts]. 
15  BH 1977.118 [Court Order]. 
16  BH 1984.489 [Court Order]. 
17  BH 1992.123 [Court Order]; Gellért (ed.), supra note 13, p. 323; T. Nochta, A gazdasági 
válság mint szerződési kockázat [Economic crisis as contractual risk], [in:] T. Nótári (ed.), Ünnepi 
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and the changes of the relations of supply and demand belong  
to the economic risk, which shall not entitle any party to suggest  
a modification and these do not lead to automatic modification  
of the contract18. The ordinary changes of the market cannot  
be cited as a legal basis for the alteration of a unique contract  
by the court: by concluding a contract both parties take a business 
risk, the alteration of the contract by the court cannot be considered 
as a possibility to eliminate or redistribute the business risk taken 
by the parties19. In conclusion, the Civil Code does not entitle  
the courts to alter unique contracts in case of changes that affect  
the whole economy or the subjects of agreements that belong  
to different contractual types20: changes in the economic milieu,  
or the collapse of the market in certain products can be considered 
as a significant change in the circumstances of the conclusion  
of the contract that cannot be expected at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract and the risks of which have to be borne mutually  
by the parties21. 
The obligated party has tried to refer to economic impossibility22  
in order to get rid of the contractual relations that became disproportionate 
because of the negative economic and market circumstances. The court 
held that the economic impossibility was not absurd. However, in the case 
of bank loan contracts, the economic changes or changes affecting  
the market during the period of repayment can be considered as business 
risk that cannot be ignored by the borrower (debtor) at moment  
of concluding a long-term loan contract. Therefore, he must take this risk23. 
In another suit the court held that the modification of the contract  
by the court cannot be suggested based on economic impossibility, since 
                                                                                                                                 
tanulmányok Sárközy Tamás 70. Születésnapjára [Celebratory volume for the birthday of Prof. Tamás 
Sárközy], Szeged: Publisher Lectum 2010, p. 211. 
18  BH 1996.145 [Court Order]; BH 1993.670 [Court Order]; Gellért (ed.), supra note 13, p. 325; 
Nochta, supra note 17, p. 211. 
19  2003/1 [Arbitration Decision]; BH 1988.80 [Court Order]; BH 1988.80 [Court Order];  
BH 1985.470 [Court Order]. 
20  The Comment of CompLex Legal Database in connection with § 241 of the Civil Code. 
21  BDT 200.277 [Casebook of the Courts]. 
22  Code Civil § 312 (1): If performance has become impossible for a reason that cannot  
be attributed to either of the parties, the contract shall be extinguished.  
23  FIT 4.Pf.21.148/2009/4 [Decision of the High Court of Appeal of Budapest]. 
45   |   Economic Crisis – the Limits of the Flexibility of Contract Law in Hungary 
according to the § 241 of the Civil Code, the judicial modification  
and the declaration of the impossibility shall be regarded as two different 
provisions of the judgment that exclude each other mutually24. 
We can also mention examples when the obligated party gave notice  
of termination25 (unilateral termination) in order to repudiate the contract 
which meant an extra burden for him. The court held that26 the defendant 
(debtor) breached the contract by terminating it since he could not refer  
to the unfavorable tendencies, the existence of which he knew when  
he concluded the contract, as a reason of the notice of termination. When 
judging the financial situation, the loss of revenue, the negative changes  
of the market, and liquidity problems cannot be accepted: the real reason  
of the termination must be considered by the facts revealed later. 
The above mentioned analysis following the dynamics of the contract 
demonstrates well that the Hungarian courts regard an economic-financial 
crisis as a contractual risk and they use the principle pacta sunt servanda 
instead of a broader sense of the clausula rebus sic stantibus. Similarly  
to the domestic courts, the European Court of Justice – the judicial  
practice of which affects the domestic judicial practice of the Member 
States27 – also considers the business-financial crisis to be a contractual risk  
and the different actors in the economy shall take the risks in connection 
with their activity. For in every contractual relation there is a risk that  
one of the parties may not fulfil the agreement in an adequate way  
or becomes insolvent: in such a case the parties must reduce the risk 
suitably in the contract itself28. 
 
 
 
                                                     
24  BDT 2000.277 [Casebook of the Courts]. 
25  The defendant terminated a contract of loan concluded with a credit institution based  
on the § 525 (1). 
26  BH 2005. 63 [Court Order]. 
27  K. Gombos, Bírói jogvédelem az Európai Unióban [Judicial Legal Protection in the European 
Union], Budapest: CompLex 2009, p. 27. 
28  Case C-47/07 Masder Ltd. (UK) v. the European Communities Committee.  
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III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC/BUSINESS RISK IN CASE  
OF CONTRACTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE HUNGARIAN CIVIL CODE29 
 
In the following, we analyze atypical and business association 
contracts from the aspect of whether the business/financial crisis  
can be considered to belong to the contractual risk. 
In the case of some atypical contracts30 we can deduce that  
the economic/business risk is part of the contractual risk: 
 in the case of a distance contract, the consumer is not entitled  
to the right of withdrawal (if not agreed otherwise) in connection 
with the changes of prices or charges depending on a fluctuation 
that cannot be controlled by the salesman in the financial market31, 
 the independent commercial agent must act in accordance  
with the principle of due diligence expected in a given situation  
in order to perform the independent commercial agency contract: 
this refers to the careful selection of the third party as well.  
The agent must examine the solvency of the client, but he does  
not have to bear the liability for the creditability of the client  
(if the third party does not perform, the agent shall not be entitled 
to get commission)32, 
 in the case of consort contracts (agreements with the purpose  
of taking part in a consumer-group), to meet debt obligations  
are not impossible only because of the difficult financial situation 
of the consumer33, 
 in connection with real factoring, debts shall be realized  
in the name and at the risk of the factor (if the factor cannot  
receive the debt from the debtor later on, he must take the risk),  
an the invoice seller is not liable for the solvency of the debtor  
                                                     
29  These contracts may be atypical, or mixed, or innominated agreements. 
30  Contracts which are regulated out of the Hungarian Civil Code by act, by international 
conventions or by government decrees and which are implemented from the Anglo-Saxon 
legal system. 
31  T. Papp, Atipikus szerződések [Atypical Contracts], Szeged: Publisher Lectum 2009, p. 45. 
32  Ibidem, p. 73. 
33  FIT-H-PJ-2009-117 [Decision of the High Court of Appeal of Budapest]. 
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(in case of the unreal factoring, the factor does not bear  
the del credere risk)34. 
In the case of a concession contract, the economic/business risk may 
already have been taken into consideration during the announcement  
of the tender (it can take its place among the “other, necessary information 
according to the tenderer”), however, if the tender does not mention  
this, then, based on section (1) of § 19 of the Concession Act35, the rules  
of alteration of the contract according to the Civil Code shall be applied36. 
There are some atypical contracts where the economic-financial 
changes that emerged after the conclusion of the contract may result  
in the termination of the contract: 
 in case of timeshare contracts, if the property affected  
by the consumer’s right to use is before or under construction  
and from the information of the company or by inspecting  
the property it becomes obvious that the property will be suitable 
for occupation only with a significant delay that results in the loss 
of interest on the part of the consumer or it will not be suitable  
for occupation after 3 years after the conclusion of the contract,  
the consumer can rescind37 (subjective right to rescind that 
sanctions the breach of the contract irrespectively of the reason), 
 termination without successor due to the insolvency of any party 
may result in the termination of the license contract38, 
 in case of the delayed, incomplete, or non payment of the leasing 
fee (even the financial-economic changes in the position  
of the lessee can result in this), the lessor is entitled to terminate  
the contract immediately39. 
The contract on business associations, due to the special nature  
of this legal relation, is an organizational (it creates a legal entity)  
and co-operational (it organizes economy), sui generis agreement40.  
                                                     
34  BH 2005.72 [Court Order]. 
35  Act XVI of 1991 about concession. 
36  Papp, supra note 31, p. 130. 
37  Ibidem, pp. 91-92. 
38  Ibidem, p. 140. 
39  Ibidem, p. 165, p. 172. 
40  C. Farkas, P. Jenovai, T. Nótári, T. Papp (ed.), Társasági jog [Company Law], Szeged: 
Publisher Lectum 2009, p. 52. 
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The general economic function of the business association is realized  
by the contract, in other words, the organization of the resources  
for a common goal41. The subjects of the contract form a special  
community of same interests (cooperation for the profit in a system  
of relations covered by a matrix of interests of many factors) that takes  
the risk for aiming the goal: liability for the result, for the risk of the jointly 
done management (liability for risk)42. From the aspect of the contract  
of company law, the appearance and handling of the economic-financial 
crisis is a phenomenon that belongs to the operation of the business 
associations. Besides, taking risk in an obviously not reasonable  
and unjustified way can lead to sanctions (e.g. the liability of the executive 
officer for the damage caused for the company): if the executive officer 
invests in buying or extracting diamonds in distant African countries  
hit by civil war in a way that cannot be controlled and by violating  
the rules of company law and also with capital that originates from  
also called “pyramid scheme”, from the money of more than twenty 
thousand retail investors, then it must be considered as a seriously 
unreasonable usage which is obviously opposed to the interests  
of the company43. 
 
IV.  EUROPEAN OVERVIEW IN RESPECT OF THE ECONOMIC/BUSINESS RISK 
 
In connection with handling the imbalance which has arisen  
by the occurrence of some events that were unforeseeable at the time  
of the conclusion of the contract, the domestic rules of private law  
of the European countries and the codes (or the draft codes) aiming  
to integrate the European private law show us different pictures. 
                                                     
41  A. Kisfaludi, Társasági jog [Company Law], Budapest: CompLex 2007, p. 42. 
42  Z. Novotni, A kodifikált társasági jog, mint a magyar polgári jog megújulásának eszköze  
[The Codified Company Law as the Instrument of Renewal of the Hungarian Civil Law], 
Jogtudományi Közlöny [Bulletin of Law Science] 1989, Issue 2, pp. 65-73; A. Kisfaludi, 
Társasági jogviták választottbíróság előtt [Disputes of Company Law at Arbitration],  
[in:] T. Papp (ed.), Acta Conventus de Iure Civili X., University of Szeged Faculty of Law 
Department of Civil Law and Civil Procedural Law, Szeged: Publisher Lectum 2009, p. 119; 
Farkas, Jenovai, Nótári, Papp (ed.), supra note 40, pp. 38-39. 
43  BDT 2004. 959. II [Casebook of the Courts]. 
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The French regulation44 persists in the principle pacta sunt servanda, 
based on the belief that a judge cannot measure the effect of his judgments 
on the national economies, therefore, he is not entitled to alter the contract 
(“modifying the contract entails the risk of threatening the performance  
of the obligation committed by the other party in connection with another 
contract, hence, through an unstoppable and unforeseeable chain reaction  
it results in a general lack of balance”)45. 
According to the Dutch, Italian and Serbian rules46, there is a difference 
between the ordinary contractual risk, arising after making an agreement 
and originating from the character of the contract, and those changes  
of circumstances that are irrespective of the nature of the agreement.  
As for the latter, the person under an unfair obligation in the Netherlands 
may ask the court for the modification or termination of the contract,  
while in Italy and Serbia the party for whom the completion of the contract 
is more burdensome, can only suggest that the court terminate the contract. 
In virtue of the Greek civil law regulation47 and the draft  
of the common reference framework48 (in this case only under  
conditions) – the same solution is implemented in the Rumanian civil  
law49 – the modification or termination of the contract because  
of extraordinary changes in the circumstances that affect the contract  
are allowed irrespectively of the relation of the risk factors to the contract. 
The German Civil Code50 provides the possibility of modifying  
a contract if – after its conclusion – an unforeseen change occurs according 
to which the contract would have not been concluded or it would  
have been concluded with different content and one of the parties  
cannot be expected to maintain this agreement in the same way.  
If the modification of the contract is not possible or it cannot be reasonably 
                                                     
44  BDT 2004.959. II [Casebook of the Courts]. 
45  Article 1148, Article 1134 of the Code Civil. 
46  T. Kadner-Graziano, J. Bóka, Összehasonlító szerződési jog [Comparative Contract Law], 
Budapest: CompLex 2010, p. 435. 
47  § 388, Kadner-Graziano, Bóka, supra note 46, p. 428. 
48  Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame  
of Reference, Munich: Sellier 2008, III-1. 110. 
49  Article 1.271 of the Codul civil; E. Veress, Új román Polgári Törvénykönyv, szerződések  
és a gazdasági válság [The New Rumanian Civil Code, Contracts and the Economic Crisis], Cluj 
Napoca: Korunk (Our time) 2012. 
50  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch § 313 Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage. 
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expected from the party, the one in a disadvantaged situation may rescind 
(or in case of permanent obligation he may cancel it). 
In connection with the unforeseen events happening after  
the conclusion, English law introduced the legal terms “frustration”  
and “hardship”. In order to solve the economic-financial crisis,  
the following preferences have been defined: principally, the parties should 
create adequate provisions in their own contract (hardship clauses),  
in absence of these, there is a possibility of modifying or terminating  
the contract by the court (intervene clause)51. 
The Project of Contractual Civil Code of Gandolfi52, the Principles  
of European Contract Law53, and the Principles of International 
Commercial Contract54 urge the parties to negotiate again in connection 
with the contract in the case of the occurrence of events that cannot  
be foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract and can cause 
contractual imbalance. If the parties cannot make an agreement  
in a reasonable time55, they can ask the court for alteration or termination. 
According to the first attempt of the Hungarian Civil Code56 which  
did not come into force, the Technical Proposal57 and the new Hungarian 
Civil Code58 for the judicial modification of a contract, the above mentioned 
regulations require the possibility of any changes in the circumstances  
not to have been foreseen. This change in the circumstances is not due  
to the parties and it cannot belong to the ordinary business risks  
of the parties59. Analyzing the last condition, there is a possibility  
                                                     
51  E. McKendrick, Contract Law, London: McMillan Law Masters 1997, pp. 255-256,  
pp. 266-271, pp. 282-284; Kadner-Graziano, Bóka, supra note 46, pp. 438-439. 
52  Articles 97, 157 of the European Contract Code 2001 (Academy of European Private 
Lawyers). 
53  Principles of European Contract Law 1995-2002 § 6:111.  
54  Principles of International Commercial Contract (UNIDROIT Convention, Rome, 2004)  
§§ 6.2.1., 6.2.2., 6.2.3.  
55  3 or 6 months according to the Civil Code of Gandolfi. 
56  Act CXX. of 2009, § 5:168 (1), the Hungarian Constitutional Court abolished it. 
57  § 5:175 (1). 
58  Act V of 2013 (will enter into force on 15.03.2014) § 6:192.  
59  L. Vékás (ed.), Szakértői Javaslat az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez [Technical Proposal  
to the Draft of the New Civil Code], Budapest: CompLex 2008, p. 845: “The Proposal based  
on the requirements of the professional economic actors makes it clear that everybody  
should measure the business risks in connection with the conclusion of the contract  
on his own and there is no possibility of reducing it in a judicial way”. 
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of avoiding considering the economic crisis and its effects as “ordinary 
business risk”, but it is necessary to change the current judicial practice. 
We agree with Tibor Nochta60 on the fact that the extra risks  
emerging after the conclusion of a contract need to be divided  
equitably and in our opinion, the Civil Code of Gandolfi, the Principles  
of the European Contract Law, and the Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts provide the best instrument to realize it. 
 
 
                                                     
60  Nochta, supra note 17, p. 216. 
  
